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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J IM JENSEN, et al., 
Plaintiffs-B espondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants, I rase M 0 
BLANCHE PARSONS, et al, ' 1 3 6 8 2 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
J IM JENSEN, et al. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment 
entered by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
of the Third Judicial District Court, declaring Section 
1 
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15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, to be null and void and 
beyond the power of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners to enact. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The captioned cases were consolidated for trial 
before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court. The cases came on 
regularly for hearing before Judge Hanson on March 
18, 1974. After hearing, Judge Hanson issued a Mem-
orandum Decision declaring Section 15-18-4 (5) of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as 
amended, to be null and void and beyond the power of 
the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners to enact. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court's 
judgment that Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Or-
dinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended, is null 
and void and beyond the power of the Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners to enact. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
On May 23, 1973, the Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners approved and enacted into law an 
amendment to Section 15-18-4 of the Revised Ordi-
2 
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nances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended. Said 
amendment provided an additional subsection (5) to 
such ordinance, which required the filing by license 
applicants with the Salt Lake County License Director: 
(5) A certificate showing that: 
a) the applicant has practiced as a massage 
therapist for a period of at least five (5) years 
prior to the date of this amendment to the Mas-
sage Parlor Regulations; or 
b) That the applicant is a graduate of a 
massage and therapy school approved by the 
American Massage and Therapy Association; or 
c) is a fully accredited member, in good 
standing, of the American Massage and Ther-
apy Association. 
Subsequent to the enactment of the above ordinance 
by the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, the 
respondents, massage parlor owners and employees of 
massage parlors respectively, brought the captioned ac-
tions seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance 
was null and void and beyond the power of the Salt 
Lake County Board of Commissioners to enact. 
The above cases were consolidated for hearing and 
came on regularly for such hearing before the Honor-
able Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court, on March 18,1974. Upon hearing, Judge 
Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision declaring Sec-
tion 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, to be null and void and 
3 
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beyond the power of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners to enact. From that decision and judg-
ment, defendants-appellants bring this appeal. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R I N 
R U L I N G T H E COUNTY O R D I N A N C E IS 
P R E E M P T E D BY SECTION 58-1-1.1 OF 
U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D (1953). 
Appellants contend in the Point I portion of their 
brief that the trial court erred in ruling that Section 
15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, is preempted by Section 
58-1-1.1, Utah Code Annotated (1953). Appellants' 
contention clearly will not withstand careful scrutiny. 
Section 58-1-1.1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
provides: 
The right to engage in any lawful profes-
sion, trade or occupation is an inherent right and 
such right shall not be impaired through state 
regulation unless the interests of the people of 
the state generally, as distinguished from those 
of a particular class, require such regulation and 
state regulation is the most effective and equit-
able means of providing the necessary protection 
to the people of the state. I t is further declared 
that the relative degree of hazard to the public 
health, safety or welfare which may result from 
an unregulated profession, trade or occupation 
4 
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shall be supported by adequate experience and 
research. Such research shall include, among 
other things: 
1. That the practitioner performs a service 
for individuals which may directly result in a 
detrimental effect upon the public health, safety 
or welfare. 
2. The view of the appropriate department 
concerning the proposed legislation and the rec-
ommendations and criticisms submitted by the 
department. 
3. The view of a substantial portion of the 
people who do not practice these particular pro-
fessions, trades or occupations. 
4. The number of states which have similar 
regulatory professions [provisions] as those pro-
posed. 
5. The view of those who shall be subject 
to the proposed regulation. 
6. That there is sufficient demand for the 
service for which there is no substitute not like-
wise regulated and this service is required by a 
substantial portion of the population. 
7. That the profession, trade or occupation 
requires high standards of public responsibility, 
character and performance of each individual 
engaged in such profession, trade or occupation 
and is so indicated by established and published 
codes of ethics. 
8. That the profession, trade or occupation 
requires such skill that the public generally is not 
qualified to select competent practitioners with-
out some visible assurance that he has met mini-
mum qualifications. 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9. That professional, trade or occupational 
associations do not adequately protect the public 
from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible 
members of the profession, trade or occupation. 
10. That the services of the profession, 
trade or occupation must be assured the public 
as a paramount consideration, regardless of cost. 
11. That those laws which pertain to public 
health, safety and welfare generally are ineffec-
tive or inadequate. The characteristics of the 
profession, trade or occupation make it impracti-
cal or impossible to prohibit those practices of 
the profession, trade or occupation which are 
detrimental to the public health, safety or wel-
fare. 
Even the most cursory reading of the above-cited 
statute discloses that such statute provides for a state 
policy of noninterference in and nonregulation of pro-
fessions, trades, and occupations unless a clear showing 
is made that the interests of the people require such 
regulation. In the event that the interests of the people 
are shown to require such regulation, the statute enunci-
ates the further standards that (a) such regulation 
should be provided by the state if state regulation is 
shown to be the most effective and equitable means of 
providing the necessary protection to the people of the 
state, and (b) such regulation should be provided for 
only subsequent to a research study gauging the degree 
of hazard to the public health, safety, or welfare that 
will result if such regulation is not provided for. 
I t should be noted that the state statute on its face 
effectively preempts the area of regulation of profes-
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sions, trades, and occupations by its declaration that the 
right to engage in a profession, trade, or occupation is 
an "inherent right" and by its clear proviso that "state 
regulation is the most effective and equitable means of 
providing the necessary protection to the people of the 
state" should regulation be found necessary. Thus, the 
county commission, by merely enacting Section 15-18-4 
(5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 
1966, as amended, has improperly intruded into an area 
of regulation foreclosed from county regulation by the 
state statute. [See Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 55 
Cal.2d 74, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974 (1960).] 
Secondly, it is manifest in the instant case that the 
state has already provided for indirect regulation of the 
practice of administering massage. In point of fact, two 
sections of Utah's Physical Therapy Practice Act 
contain provisions relating to the practice of administer-
ing massage. 
Section 58-24-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) pro-
vides : 
(1) One year from the effective date of 
this act, no person shall practice or hold himself 
out as being able to practice physical therapy for 
compensation received or expected, in this state, 
unless he is licensed in accordance with the pro-
visions of this act; provided, however, that no-
thing in this act shall prohibit: 
(a) Any person licensed under the laws 
of this state from engaging in the practice for 
which he is licensed. 
7 
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(b) A person not licensed under this act 
from administering massage, external baths, 
or normal exercise,, provided stich person does 
not in amy way represent himself to be a phy-
sical therapist. 
(c) Any person employed by an agency, 
bureau or division of the government of the 
United States from performing the duties for 
which he is employed while he is performing 
the duties of such employment. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Section 58-24-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953) pro-
vides : 
(1) The department and the committee 
shall issue a license as a physical therapist to each 
person who meets the following qualifications: 
(a) Is a resident of the state of Utah at 
the time of the passage of this act. 
(b) Complies with the provisions of sec-
tion 58-24-6 (1), (2) and (3). 
(c) Makes application within six months 
after the effective date of this act. 
(d) Was practicing physical therapy: 
(1) In the state of Utah at the time 
of passage of this act, or 
(2) For at least three years during the 
past seven years, including at least one year 
of practice in this state. 
(e) Pays a licensing fee of $5. 
(2) The department and the committee 
may, in their discretion, issue a license as a phy-
8 
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sical therapist to a person who meets the follow-
ing qualifications: 
(a) Qualifies under section 58-1-19, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
(b) Is a resident of the state of Utah. 
(c) Complies with the provisions of sec-
tion 58-24-6 (1), (2), (3) and (6). 
For the purposes of this section, a person 
merely administering massages, external baths 
or normal exercise shall not be deemed to be a 
physical therapist or entitled to licensure under 
this section. (Emphasis added.) 
The above statutes clearly indicate that the Legis-
lature has reviewed the practice of administering mas-
sage in connection with the enactment of the Physical 
Therapy Practice Act and has concluded that the 
practice of massage is not a profession, trade, or oc-
cupation so affecting the public interest as to require 
state regulation. Since the State Legislature has ap-
parently made that determination, the county ordinance 
constitutes an unwarranted and improper intrusion by 
the county into an area of regulation preempted by the 
State Legislature. 
Finally, even if we assume, arguendo, that the 
county could properly regulate the practice of admini-
stering massage, it would still be necessary for the 
county, in enacting such a regulatory ordinance, to con-
form to the procedural requirements established by Sec-
tioh 58-1-1.1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) relating 
to necessary "research" gauging the degree of hazard 
9 
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to the public safety, health, or welfare that will result 
if such regulation is not provided for. In the instant 
case, no such "research" was conducted precedent to the 
enactment of the ordinance and therefore the ordinance 
for that reason does not conform to the requirements of 
Section 58-1-1.1. 
From the above it should be abundantly clear that 
Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County is preempted by Section 58-1-1.1, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). For that reason, this court 
should affirm the decision of the trial court that the 
county ordinance is null and void and beyond the power 
of the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners to 
enact. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT DID NOT E R R I N 
R U L I N G T H E COUNTY O R D I N A N C E IS 
P R E E M P T E D BY T H E C R I M I N A L CODE 
W I T H I T S E N U M E R A T E D P R O H I B I T I O N S 
AND P E N A L T I E S W I T H R E G A R D TO S E X 
ACTS. 
Appellants contend in the Point I I portion of their 
brief that the trial court erred in ruling that Section 
15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, is preempted by the Utah 
Criminal Code with its enumerated prohibitions and 
penalties with regard to sex acts. This argument also 
will not bear careful examination. 
10 
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I t is well established as a matter of law that a county 
or municipal ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose 
additional prohibitions or requirements in an area al-
ready occupied by the state, or is in conflict with or dup-
licates state law in an area where the state has already 
legislated. Lancaster v. Municipal Court for the Bever-
ly Hills Judicial District of Los Angeles County, 100 
Cal. Rptr. 609, 494 P.2d 681 (1972); Corey v. City of 
Dallas, 352 F . Supp. 977 (1972). 
In Lancaster v. Municipal Court for the Beverly 
Hills Judicial District of Los Angeles County, supra, 
the California Supreme Court held that a county ordi-
nance which prohibited the massage of a person by a 
member of the opposite sex constituted a regulation of 
sexual conduct and was therefore invalid because the 
state had preempted the regulation of criminal aspects 
of sexual activity to the exclusion of local regulation. 
The court found that although it was argued that the 
ordinance should be viewed as a regulation of the 
massage parlor business and not as a regulation of 
sexual conduct, the underlying purpose of the ordinance 
was to make the task of the police department easier in 
their fight against prostitution and lewd conduct, and 
therefore the ordinance was a regulation of sexual 
conduct and must be held invalid because the state 
had preempted the regulation of the criminal aspects of 
sexual activity. In its decision, the court said: 
There has been no suggestion of any reason-
able purpose to the ordinance before us other 
than to limit sexual activity. Although it has been 
U 
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urged that the ordinance should be viewed as a 
regulation of the business of administering mas-
sages and not a sexual regulation, the only speci-
fication of any actual or potential evil is the 
sexual activity which may follow in the wake of 
the massage. 
# # # 
At oral argument the district attorney ad-
mitted that the ordinance was a sexual regulation 
when he stated, "The purpose of the prohibition 
. . . is to regulate a source of licentiousness . . . 
this ordinance regulates nude exposure." This 
admission clearly indicates that the purpose of 
the ordinance in question was not to regulate the 
operation of massage parlors but was aimed at 
making the task of the police department and 
sheriff's office easier in their fight against prosti-
tution and lewd conduct. W e are satisfied that 
the ordinance is a regulation of the criminal as-
pects of sexual conduct. . . . 
We conclude that the Los Angeles ordi-
nance which is a regulation of sexual conduct 
must be held invalid because the state has pre-
empted the criminal aspects of sexual activity. 
(494 P.2d at 683-684.) 
Similarly, in Corey v. City of Dallas, supra, the 
United States District Court for the Northern Division 
of Texas, in overturning a city ordinance prohibiting 
massage upon persons of the opposite sex, held that the 
ordinance was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment since there were alternative methods which the 
city could employ to achieve the ordinance's explicit 
purpose of prohibiting illegal sexual conduct. 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In its decision the court found that the underlying 
purpose of the ordinance was to prohibit illegal sexual 
conduct, and since the ordinance affected the funda-
mental right to work, the interest of the City of Dallas 
in enforcing the ordinance must be based on a compel-
ling governmental interest. The court concluded that 
such compelling governmental interest was lacking in 
the case because there were alternative methods which 
the city could employ to achieve the objectives of the 
ordinance without affecting the rights of persons to carry 
on a legitimate business since there were other city 
ordinances and state statutes which prohibited lewd and 
immoral conduct. In its decision, the court said: 
The evidence in this case shows that the 
underlying purposes of Section 25A-15 are the 
prohibition of illegal sexual conduct between 
persons of the opposite sex under the guise of 
administering massages and the formulation of 
agreements between males and females to com-
mit such acts at other places. 
The court feels such an interest is lacking 
in this case because there are alternative methods 
which the City of Dallas may employ to achieve 
the objective of the ordinance. . . . There are . . . 
other city ordinances and state statutes which 
prohibit lewd and immoral conduct. Since alter-
native remedies are available to the City of Dal-
las, the objectives of Section 25A-15 are not 
superior to the fundamental rights of those who 
may be adversely affected by the enforcement of 
that provision of the ordinance. (352 F . Supp. at 
981-982.) 
13 
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Applying the above-cited cases and authority to the 
facts in the instant case, it is clear that Section 15-18-4 
(5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 
1966, as amended, is invalid in that it attempts to impose 
additional prohibitions or requirements in an area al-
ready occupied by the state. 
Evidence adduced at trial in this matter established 
clearly and beyond dispute that the underlying purpose 
of subsection (5) of Section 15-18-4 of the Revised Or-
dinances is not to regulate the operation of massage par-
lors or to set standards for massagists, but to assist Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's officers in combating illegal 
sexual activities allegedly associated with local mas-
sage parlors. [See in this regard the testimony of Com-
missioner Pete Kutulas, Tr. 111-112, and the testimony 
of Nicholas G. Morgan, 111, Tr. 117-119.] 
Since the underlying purpose of subsection (5) of 
Section 15-18-4 of the Revised Ordinances is not to 
regulate the operation of massage parlors or to set 
standards for massagists, but to assist Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's officers in combating and regulating illicit 
sexual activity, subsection (5) directly supplements and 
conflicts with existing state (Utah Code Annotated Sec-
tions 76-10-1301 thru -06 (1953) and county (Section 
16-23-4) criminal legislation under the guise of regula-
ting massagists. For that reason, subsection (5) consti-
tutes an unwarranted and improper intrusion by the 
county into an area of regulation preempted by the State 
Legislature. Thus, the trial court properly struck down 
14 
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the ordinance as null and void and beyond the power of 
the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners to enact. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT DID NOT E R R I N 
R U L I N G T H E COUNTY O R D I N A N C E ARBI-
TRARY, U N C E R T A I N , AND VAGUE. 
Appellants contend in the Point I I I portion of 
their brief that the trial court erred in ruling that Section 
15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1966, as amended, was arbitrary, uncertain, and 
vague. This argument also is misconceived and will not 
withstand close analysis. 
Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordiances of 
Salt Lake County is clearly an arbitrary and unreason-
able exercise of police power because it arbitrarily dis-
criminates between persons who can qualify under the 
ordinance and persons who, regardless of their qualifi-
cations, do not meet the prescribed standards and conse-
quently cannot qualify. I t requires that an applicant for 
a license either have five years' prior experience as a 
massage therapist or be a graduate of an approved 
school of massage therapy or be an accredited member 
of the American Massage and Therapy Association. I t 
contains no provision for alternative procedures for 
qualification for individuals who have an established 
practice as a massagist, but fail to have the required 
five years' experience or education or membership to be 
able to demonstrate their qualifications. Nor does it 
15 
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provide for an apprentice-type program for individuals 
presently employed within the profession so they can 
acquire the necessary experience. Consequently, the 
effect of subsection (5) is to prohibit those individuals 
from practicing their chosen occupation, not because 
they are incompetent or unethical or engage in immoral 
activities, but because they not do have the good fortune 
to meet the standards that are arbitrarily established and 
required. 
Other courts have held similar legislative attempts 
to regulate individuals practicing in the healing arts to 
be unconstitutionally arbitrary and unreasonable so as 
to constitute a denial of equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Whittle v. State Board of 
Examiners of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328 (1971); 
Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 18 Cal. 
Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101 (1963); J.S.K. Enterprises v. 
City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (1971) ; 
Snedeker v. Venmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439 (1963). 
In Whittle v. State Board of Examiners of Psy-
chologists, supra, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held 
unreasonable a state statute similar to the county ordi-
nance challenged in the instant case. The statute re-
quired that a psychologist, if he did not have a doctor's 
degree, have five years' experience under approved 
supervision in order to be licensed, but made no provi-
sion for an alternate way for him to establish or demon-
strate his qualifications or competence. In its decision, 
striking down the statute, the court said: 
16 
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Since Plaintiffs-in-Error had established a 
successful practice as psychologists in Oklahoma 
at a time when it was lawful to do so in this State 
without licensing, that practice must be viewed as 
a vested property right, subject only to such sub-
sequent regulation as might be reasonably and 
rationally related to safeguarding the public 
health and welfare . . . . We feel that under the 
circumstances, the Board should have established 
some reasonable alternative procedure for allow-
ing the applicant to demonstrate his competence. 
We hold that since the applicant was not statu-
torily entitled to take the examination to demon-
strate his competence, the administrative rule 
herein resulting in the denial of a license without 
a suitable alternative procedure to demonstrate 
such competence was unreasonable. (483 P.2d at 
329-330.) 
Similarly, in Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, supra, the California Supreme Court held that 
a licensing statute for an optician was invalid in that it 
prescribed that the necessary five years' experience 
could be obtained in only two ways, neither of which 
was arguably superior to many other ways of obtaining 
experience. 
In its decision, the court concluded that the neces-
sary expertise could be obtained in ways other than that 
outlined in the statute, and that there was an absence of 
any relationship between the requirements imposed and 
the object of the legislation. In its decision, the court 
held: 
There is a complete absence of any relation-
ship between the experience requirements sought 
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to be imposed and the legislative effort to correct 
ethical abuses in the profession. The Legislature 
has taken direct action against these abuses and 
may take such further action as it deems neces-
sary, but it cannot reasonably be concluded that 
the legislation in question bears any relation to 
these problems. (368 P.2d at 104.) 
In J.S.K. Enterprises v. City of Lacey, supra, the 
Washington Supreme Court struck down a city massage 
parlor ordinance prohibiting massages upon persons by 
members of the opposite sex. The court held that the 
ordinance constituted an unreasonable exercise of police 
power in that (a) it went beyond the objective of 
protecting the public from lewd acts in massage parlors, 
(b) was unduly oppressive to massagists and their 
patients, and (c) constituted discrimination on the basis 
of sex. 
In its decision, the court recognized that the mas-
sage business was a potential setting for lewd and im-
moral acts. Further, it acknowledged that a city, in the 
exercise of its police power, could regulate massagists 
on the grounds of public health, safety, or welfare. But 
the court stressed that, as in any other exercise of the 
police power, the means adopted must be reasonably 
necessary and appropriate to accomplish the objective 
sought, and must not be unduly oppressive upon indivi-
duals. Applying these criteria, the court found that the 
ordinance was an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise 
of police power because it went beyond the means 
necessary and appropriate to accomplish its objective 
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and was unduly oppressive to massagists and their 
patients. 
Finally, in Snedeker v. Venmar, Ltd., supra, a 
suit for declaratory judgment was brought to determine 
the constitutionality of a statute regulating masseurs 
which required (a) that such persons be graduates of an 
accredited massage school, or (b) that such persons sub-
mit proof of like experience or education. The question 
raised was whether or not the provision was reasonably 
related to public interests which may be protected by the 
exercise of police power. In its decision, the Florida 
court held that there was no reasonable relationship 
between the statutory requirement and public safety 
or welfare because the course of technical training re-
quired (600 hours' schooling or like experience) would 
not make the masseurs any more competent in their 
particular occupation or enable them to perform those 
functions better, and was therefore not an interest in 
behalf of which the police power could be properly 
exercised. 
Applying the rationale of the above-cited cases to 
the facts in the instant case, there is no indication that 
the requirements imposed by subsection (5) bear any 
rational relationship to the experience or training neces-
sary to become a competent massagist. The ordinance 
simply overlooks the fact that there are other ways to 
become a qualified massagist. I t attempts to place mas-
sagists in the category of physical therapists, and it is 
unreasonable to impose or correlate the educational 
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requirements and experience required to be a physical 
therapist with the experience and training to become a 
massagist. Because the experience or educational re-
quirements are disproportionate to actual training and 
experience necessary to become a competent massagist, 
and because there is no provision for massagists who do 
not meet those requirements to demonstrate their com-
petence, the ordinance is an arbitrary and unreasonable 
exercise of police power. 
Secondly, even though admittedly there are un-
deniable abuses within the massage profession, both the 
state (Utah Code Annotated Sections 76-10-1301 thru 
-06 (1953) and the county (Section 16-23-4) have 
legistlation directed against any such abuses, and 
can therefore take direct action against such abuses. 
The requirements imposed by subsection (5) bear no 
reasonable relationship to either abuses within the pro-
fession or regulation of massagists. Since the require-
ments imposed by subsection (5) have no reasonable 
relationship to abuses within the profession or regula-
tion of massagists, and since the ordinance effectively 
acts as an outright prohibition of the right of individuals 
to work in their chosen occupation, the ordinance is an 
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the power to 
regulate. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in ruling that Section 
15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
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County, 1966, as amended, is preempted by Section 
58-1-1.1 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953). More-
over, the trial court did not err in ruling that said county 
ordinance is preempted by the Utah Criminal Code's 
enumerated prohibitions and penalties with regard to 
sex acts. Finally, the trial court did not err in ruling that 
such ordinance was uncertain, arbitrary, and vague on 
its face. This court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
that Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended, is null, void, and 
beyond the power of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners to enact. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P H I L L. H A N S E N 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
• v Respondents Jim Jensen, et al. 
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